No Friends But the Mountains: Kurdish Autonomy in Post-Assad Syria

By: Olivia Babcock

Edited by: Parmis Mokhtari-Dizaji and Rose Kores

Background

Kurds are the largest ethnic group in the world without a nation.¹ They live in Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran, where they maintain a strong military presence and have historically partnered with the West. Kurds have been a source of stability in the Middle East, aiding efforts against terrorism and promoting human rights in the region, serving as a stalwart and reliable partner for the West. Now, Syrian Kurds are fighting for autonomy in the post-Assad government.² Kurdish solidarity has intensified and spread across Turkey, Iran, and Iraq, where daily protests are held in the Kurdish capital, Erbil.³ In the midst of increased Kurdish solidarity, the new Syrian government in Damascus has launched attacks against Kurds, relying on terror tactics and targeting women and symbols of Kurdish identity.

Kurdish women have been an important military force for the past decade. The Women’s Protection Units, or Yekîneyên Parastina Gel in Kurdish (YPJ), an all-female defense force founded in 2013, were instrumental in defeating ISIS in Syria and Iraq. The group is dedicated to protecting women, Kurdish identity, and the right to self-determination. The YPJ also fought against Turkish forces in Afrin, Syria, in 2018, which sought to eliminate Kurds and their identity.⁴

The Current Situation

Rojava, a semi-autonomous Kurdish area in northeastern Syria, is under genocide watch. Since the fall of the Assad regime, the new Syrian government has focused on uniting the country in the aftermath of the civil war, but its methods have been questionable. In order to achieve unity, the government has launched attacks against autonomous Kurdish areas in eastern Syria, where the Kurdish-led military, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), have lost the territory and autonomy secured during the civil war. The campaign against Syrian Kurds is characterized by cutting access to water and electricity, displacement, food scarcity, forced exposure to winter conditions, and violence and humiliation, especially against women and children.⁵

In January, a Syrian Arab Army combatant posted a video in which he boasted about cutting a braid from a female Kurdish fighter’s body. This sparked international outrage and resulted in protests across the Arab world, where women gathered to publicly braid each other’s hair in defiance of the gendered violence against Kurdish women in Syria.⁶ Because of the cultural significance of the braid, the video has been cited as an instance of genocidal intent by Syrian forces. Moayad Afana, a legal researcher, reported to The Iraqi News Agency that the braid cutting was a “flagrant violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention.”⁶ Deniz Çiya, a prominent female Kurdish fighter, was publicly thrown from a building, and other videos have shown beheading and sexual violence against Kurdish fighters.⁷ The attacks on women and culturally significant symbols are indicative of attempted Kurdish annihilation. A Genocide Watch report states that, “Kurds are being punished for seeking autonomy, their aspiration branded as illegitimate. Kurdish identity is being attacked through symbolic violence. The campaign is coordinated and escalating into a humanitarian disaster.”⁵ The attacks are part of broader efforts to curb Kurdish autonomy and prevent Kurds from freely expressing their cultural identity.

Governmental Responses

Syria

The fall of the Assad regime is an opportunity for Syria to promote human rights and protect minorities. Kurdish rule in northeastern Syria was characterized by leftist ideas and centered on women’s empowerment and leadership. Many were hopeful that the end of the civil war and a regime change in Damascus would protect minorities and create a more humanitarian government.

In January, the Syrian government and the Kurdish SDF committed to several ceasefire agreements that were violated, resulting in continued fighting in Kurdish-held areas. The government in Damascus has sought a unified Syrian state, with hopes of eliminating Kurdish autonomy in the northeast. Damascus’s plan has recently been backed by Washington, a long-time supporter of Kurds, undermining Kurdish independence efforts.⁸ With no international support, Kurds lost territory to the Syrian Army through force, terror, and violence. The Syrian government, on the other hand, was backed by Arab militias and Turkey, which worked together to intimidate Kurds into surrendering land they ruled for over a decade.⁹

Despite the fact the new government has employed terror tactics against Kurds, there have been positive signs that the ethnic group will be protected legally under the new regime. For instance, the Kurdish new year, Nowruz, has been formally recognized and Kurdish language education will be made available in Syria. Many argue that these efforts fall short because Kurdish and other minority rights have not been written into the new constitution.⁸ Given that Damascus is willing to use force against ethnic minorities, these small gestures are not enough to secure Kurdish safety. Damascus has succeeded in taking back Kurdish territory, but it still remains to be seen how the new Syria will interact with Kurds moving forward.

Turkey

Turkey has backed the new Syrian government since the fall of the Assad regime and has a long history of anti-Kurdish sentiment. Turkey has designated its main Kurdish political party, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a terrorist organization, and has led numerous campaigns against Kurds within the country’s borders. Ankara views the SDF as a branch of the PKK and has provided military support in campaigns waged against Kurds in Syria earlier this year.¹⁰ The Turkish government views Damascus as a key security partner and has continued to back anti-Kurdish efforts.

The historic tension between Ankara and Kurds has led Turkey to promote national security by pursuing peace and reconciliation efforts with Kurds who live in the country. Turkish Kurds argue that the government’s backing of the Syrian government undermines these efforts.¹¹ While Ankara tries to make peace at home, the government is actively backing international anti-Kurdish efforts. The violence against Syrian Kurds is widely attributed to a broader internationally backed campaign against Kurds in the region that would not be possible without Turkey’s support.

Iraq

The violence against Kurds in Syria has prompted a period of Kurdish unity across the region. Erbil, the capital of the semi-autonomous Kurdish region in Iraq has served as a hub for pro-Kurdish advocacy where daily protests were held across the capital and in front of the U.S. consulate.¹² While the response from Baghdad has been limited, the government of Iraqi-Kurdistan has rallied in support for Kurds in Rojava by sending aid for internally displaced people.¹² This Kurdish solidarity is fueled in part by Kurds’ perception that Washington has abandoned them once again. Kurdish President Masoud Barzani raised concerns about the potential resurgence of ISIS amid the violence in Rojava and has joined Kurds in calling for international intervention. Erbil quickly came to the aid of Syrian Kurds, coordinating international and regional communication, hosting talks with the U.S. Special Envoy Tom Barrack and Admiral Brad Cooper, head of the U.S. Central Command, about peace efforts,¹³ and offered all possible resources to bring an end to the conflict.¹⁴

United States

While Kurds across the Middle East have long been key strategic partners for Washington, levels of support for the ethnic group have varied greatly across administrations. At the end of his term, former President Biden secured U.S. influence in Rojava by reinforcing military positions to ensure Kurds remained in control of northeastern Syria.¹⁵ In his previous term, President Trump sided with Turkey over Syrian Kurds, asking forces in Rojava to withdraw seasoned fighters along the border, resulting in a Turkish invasion of the region.¹⁶

Washington’s tepid response to the genocide in Rojava and Trump’s continued capitulation to Erdoğan prompted the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission and the House Foreign Affairs Committee to claim that Turkey’s human rights violations are allowed because top policy advisors, including U.S. Ambassador Tom Barrack, do not hold Ankara accountable.¹⁷ In a special congressional hearing on the situation in Rojava, policy expert Nadine Maenza, called for the passage of the “Save the Kurds Act.”¹⁸ The bill has not made progress since January 29th, 2026, and ultimately, Washington did not aid their long term allies in defending the territory of Rojava. In February, Trump ordered a full withdrawal of U.S. troops from Syria and has withdrawn Assad era sanctions, allowing Damascus’s new government more economic freedom and mobility. The Trump administration supports Damascus’s desire for “territorial integrity,” essentially endorsing the reclamation of Kurdish territory.¹⁹ Washington has conditionally backed the government in Damascus and has seemingly suspended support for Kurds and their quest for autonomy. While the Trump administration has called on the new Syrian government to treat minorities equally, there was little U.S. intervention to support Kurds facing genocidal conditions.

The Future of Kurds

The future of Syria and the Kurds who live within its borders is still unknown. Progress has been made, as Syria has taken steps to recognize Kurdish cultural identity, and many Kurds who were driven from Afrin by a Turkish-led offensive have returned to the city.²⁰ Syria has also provided citizenship for all Kurds and recognized Kurdish as a national language alongside Arabic.²¹

Risks, however, outweigh this progress. The war in Iran threatens to upend Syria’s fragile transition. Iranian drones intercepted in Syria have rained debris, killing civilians. Around 140,000 civilians have fled Israeli bombs in Lebanon, seeking safety in Syria, which does not have the resources to support refugees. Critical infrastructure in Kurdish areas is still damaged, and there is not steady access to water, food, or medical care.²² Internally displaced Kurds lack access to basic needs, and humanitarian aid efforts have not kept up with demand.

Iraqi Kurdistan has stood in solidarity with Syrian Kurds, offering public support to the SDF and sending humanitarian aid to Rojava.²¹ The Kurdish party in Turkey has also voiced concerns about the treatment of Syrian Kurds and the new government. This year, Mazloum Abdi, the leader of the SDF, traveled to the Munich Security Conference where he met with Western officials and placed Kurds on the world stage.²¹

While Kurdish solidarity across Syria, Iraq, Turkey, and Iran has grown since the attacks in Rojava earlier this year, the West has seemingly abandoned its longtime Kurdish allies, which were instrumental in defeating ISIS in Syria. Countries such as the UK, US, Turkey, Algeria, Denmark, and Pakistan have called for the protection of Syria amid the conflict in Iran, but international support is aimed at Damascus, not Kurdish forces.²¹

International support for Kurds appears to be declining, even as foreign governments urge Kurds to assist in another conflict. Yet, Syrian Kurds have lost more than territory in 2026. Kurdish fighting forces, including the all-female YPJ and the SDF brigades, will be integrated into the Syrian army, and civil servants from the autonomous Kurdish region will be brought into the state bureaucracy.²² Kurds have lost almost all autonomy and are being brought into a government that leaves little room for self-determination.

US support for the SDF is waning, and Turkey continues to urge Syrian Kurds, whom the government views as terrorists, to lay down their arms and join the new Syrian state. The effects of Kurdish solidarity and presence at world summits are yet to be seen, but given Syria’s mission to centralize both national and foreign support for this approach, it appears that Kurds have lost their place in the Syrian government.

Works Cited

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Author Bio

Olivia Babcock is a first year Master’s in Public Administration student, Reynold’s Leadership Fellow, and Global Democracy Fellow at Cornell. She holds a B.A. in history from the University of Puget Sound where she focused on South Africa’s transition to democracy and restorative peace efforts. Since then, she has served as a Fulbright Fellow at the University of Zambia, a leader for the Iraqi Young Leader’s Exchange Program, and Program Coordinator at World Learning.