Negotiation: The Policymaker’s Tool for Changing the World

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By: Paul Robert Caruso

Edited By: Rose Kores

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Executive Summary

Given the global increase in conflict and our inability to address it, we must revisit negotiation as a vessel for policy change. When analyzing the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian war, it becomes clear that previous attempts at resolution have failed to use effective methods.

The problems are three-fold: negotiators keep introducing counterproposals, mediators keep leaving parties out of discussions, and ripeness has been difficult to create. 

This analysis recommends that pro-peace actors: 

1. Use unreasonable proposals as opportunities to show that demands are unrealistic and to gather support from allies.
2. Ensure all stakeholders are represented and have decision-making power. 
3. Use policy to create ripeness, the conditions necessary to make parties come to the table. 

Problem Statement

As the world exhibits the greatest amount of conflict since the second World War, it is easy to find oneself at a loss for solutions.¹ Multiple attempts to resolve conflicts have ended with mixed results or none altogether. 

Using the war between Ukraine and Russia as an example, there are tangible mistakes in the strategy and tactics being used by mediators and negotiators. These mistakes have potentially extended the duration of the war, underscoring the urgency of learning quickly and adjusting  existing approaches.

Definitions

Negotiation as an art faces a dual status in public affairs: a tool for getting things done, and a policy decision in itself (i.e. the decision to negotiate). At the top, representatives and agenda-setters work behind the scenes to pass legislation. Down the government bureaucracy, officials converse with stakeholders about resources, inclusivity, and setting departmental budgetary and policy priorities. 

Negotiation is a discussion of positions and interests by parties to some end, which can include agreements. It is one component of conflict resolution, which can include other elements like mediation, truthfinding commissions, hearings, dialogue frameworks, and face-saving techniques. 

‘Ripeness’ is a popular theory stating conflict may be resolved when parties achieve a ‘mutually-hurting stalemate.’ This is where parties are enduring pain without making progress. Policy can be leveraged to achieve ripeness, and negotiation is often the only way to achieve those policy milestones. 

The Mistakes in Russia and Ukraine: A case study in how negotiation concepts help us analyze ongoing conflict

This list is not comprehensive, however it represents three critical focuses that must be addressed. Mistakes can be made by both negotiators and mediators on an individual level, and the below items are big-picture conflict resolution blunders that have caused us to regress. 

     1. Introducing multiple counterproposals: mistakes by negotiators 

Introducing counterproposals is rarely effective. Oftentimes, they can be inflammatory and cause counterparts to react defensively. The temptation to create a counterproposal comes from a desire to set the agenda by anchoring the negotiations. When making the first offer, the ‘anchor’ is the reference point that negotiators will measure the new deal terms against as either closer or further from the original proposal. This can be a good idea because it can set the agenda and increase the likelihood that one’s terms are more closely met. However, counteroffers are often offensive, given that they discard all previous work on the original proposal.  

Throughout the timeline of talks, both Russian and Ukrainian negotiators have proposed multiple peace plans. The first Russian peace plan in the early weeks of the war called for the recognized annexation of Crimea and the Donbas; a substantial reduction of Ukraine’s military; a forced change of culture; and, few legal or physical means for Ukraine to defend itself.² 

Ukraine did not accept those terms because it deemed them unreasonable relative to the amount of pain it had sustained in the first month. However, the next Ukrainian proposal came in the form of a 10-point peace plan, introduced in November of that same year.³ The content of the peace plan was good, however introducing it as an opposing plan had the expected effect: it did not lead to progress. Skilled negotiators must use strategically-minded questions and dialogues to understand the underlying interests behind the positions originally proposed. When Russia made its demands, those demands were simply the policies they thought would accomplish their unspoken interests. The job of a negotiator is finding what the underlying interest is and using creative policy solutions to meet those interests while also accomplishing their own.

     2. Leaving out the relevant stakeholders: mistakes by mediators

The August 2023 Jeddah Peace Summit represents a missed opportunity by would-be-mediator Saudi Arabia. Ukraine was able to present its peace plan to the 40 countries attending the summit, and repaired its relationship with the United States.⁴ However, the summit and its recommendations for peace were eventually ineffectual, as Russia, notably not invited, never agreed to the terms created by the United States and Ukraine.³ 

This was not the last time that a key decision-maker was left out of the conversation. In February 2025, Saudi Arabia again hosted talks, this time in Riyadh, involving the United States and Russia but not Ukraine. This time, Kyiv’s exclusion was controversial. Immediately, Ukraine and the rest of the world believed that the new Trump administration would favor Putin’s peace terms over Ukraine’s, leaving Russia in an apt position to consider further incursions into Europe.⁵ 

This trend was later reiterated during the Russia-United States Summit hosted in Anchorage, Alaska on August 15, 2025. After this meeting, statements by President Trump caused allies and Ukraine to worry that the U.S. would push for a “swapping of territories” without consulting Kyiv.³ The behavior by the United States resembles an attempt at shuttle diplomacy, where a mediator ‘shuttles’ information and proposals between two parties, however it is not clear whether the U.S. is actually facilitating this. Negative reactions by Zelensky indicate that he did not authorize the proposals made by the U.S., which is a key step in conducting shuttle diplomacy.⁶ 

     3. Ripeness is no longer present: mistakes by everyone 

If both sides reach a ‘mutually hurting stalemate,’ they would be more likely to make progress in negotiations, however Russia does not find itself in this state. 

Scholars argue that a brief window of ripeness emerged in the conflict’s early days, before Russia’s partial mobilization, when the costs of invasion were particularly high. However, this ripeness disappeared after the mobilization since Russia readjusted its pain tolerance.⁷ Subsequently, sanctions have fallen short of meaningfully constraining Russia’s economy or penalizing its leadership, while exceptions have helped sustain it. Trade with China has also helped prop up the economy, though it has made Russia somewhat dependent on them.⁸ 

Most recently, the price of oil has climbed, which has allowed Russia to sell at a higher market price for the same supply. The impact has been an important buoy to the economy, which was struggling before. Now, economic opportunity has alleviated some pressure and moved us even further from ripe conditions.⁹

Recommendations

These recommendations should be taken together; neglecting any one of them will leave gaps that perpetuate the conflict. 

     1. Use unreasonable proposals to show that demands are unrealistic and gather support from allies. Engage with parties and use unacceptable demands as prompts for dialogue. 

When the other party makes unreasonable asks, engage in dialogue to make sure they know why and to what extent their demands are so. While it is unlikely that Putin would be sympathetic to the Ukrainians, the point is that engaging with the unreasonable demand allows an opportunity to show that their stance is causing conflict to continue. Over time, you can work with the other parties to create working sessions around the issues raised by the first proposal and change the content of the draft dramatically. Offering a counterproposal changes the focus of peace talks and takes away this opportunity. It also opens you up to criticism as both the rejecter and the person who may have inactionable terms. It is inefficient at best and inflammatory at worst.  

Further, working within the terms of the first proposal shows the other side that despite their unreasonable demands, you are taking the situation seriously – even if every part of the draft is changed by the end of the negotiation process. 

     2. Ensure all stakeholders are represented and have decision-making power. 

This is two-fold: mediators and negotiators alike need to make sure that peace summits are inclusive of all parties. Mediation is unlikely to be successful without negotiators having difficult conversations face to face. Leaving a party out will increase the likelihood that they defect from peacebuilding efforts.

Furthermore, representatives of the various parties should have as much decision-making power as possible. Conducting a summit simply with messengers who don’t have negotiating authority is a waste of time; getting officials at similar levels of seniority and decision-making power is crucial.

     3. Use policy to create ripeness. 

The global consensus is to expand sanctions and truly enforce them, however the prospect of sanctions against China, Russia’s top trading partner, is less attractive. Oil exports account for the majority of Russia’s trade revenue with China, totaling approximately $95 billion.¹⁰ As a result, it may be advisable to decrease Russia’s ability to export oil to China, or for allies to sell oil to China at a rate lower than Russia can.

Russia operates a “shadow fleet” of oil tankers exporting oil through arctic pathways. Attempts to interfere with this fleet may prove risky, however policy solutions should focus on reducing its effectiveness. Among several options, some analysts suggest forming global coalitions to enforce international trade law, with a focus on Russia’s illicit trade activities, so that their tankers can be seized.¹¹ This has precedent and is gaining traction, with the United Kingdom most recently vowing to begin seizing tankers in its territorial waters.¹² 

The key is to use these actions to bring Russia to the negotiating table. Eventually, the prospect of lifting sanctions will incentivize the adoption of a formal peace plan, along with the normalization of global relations, leading to domestic stability. These will hopefully make a peace agreement seem more attractive than continuing the war. 

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Work Cited

1. “New Data Shows Conflict at Historic High as U.S. Signals Retreat from World Stage.” 2025. Peace Research Institute Oslo. https://www.prio.org/news/3616.
2. Dickinson, Peter. 2024. “Putin’s 2022 ‘Peace Proposal’ Was a Blueprint for the Destruction of Ukraine.” Atlantic Council. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/putins-2022-peace-proposal-was-a-blueprint-for-the-destruction-of-ukraine/.
3. Gutterman, Ivan, and Wojtek Grojec. 2025. “A Chronology of Ukraine Peace Talks.” RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty. https://www.rferl.org/a/putin-alaska-ukraine-trump-interactive/33503122.html.
4. Rzheutska, Liliia. 2025. “Ukraine: Guarded Optimism after US Peace Talks in Jeddah.” https://www.dw.com/en/ukraine-guarded-optimism-after-us-peace-talks-in-jeddah/a-71904177.
5. Sauer, Pjotr, Luke Harding, and David Smith. 2025. “US and Russia Agree to Explore Mutual Opportunities of End to Ukraine War.” The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/feb/18/us-russia-ukraine-talks-riyadh-saudi-arabia#:~:text=Nathalie%20Tocci%20and%20Yanis%20Varoufakis,Ukraine%27s%20civilian%20energy%20supply%20system.
6. Kerr, Nicholas, and Julia Cherner. 2025. “Zelenskyy Says Trump’s Alaska Summit ‘Gave Putin What He Wanted.’” ABC News. https://abcnews.com/Politics/zelenskyy-trumps-alaska-summit-gave-putin-wanted/story?id=125336611.
7. Yasui, Hinako, and Hideaki Shinoda. 2025. “The Scope of the Ripeness Theory in the Russo-Ukrainian War.” SpringerBriefs in International Relations, pp. 71–80. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-96-2295-5_6.
8. Wong, Wailin, and Paddy Hirsch. 2026. “Why Hasn’t the Russian Economy Collapsed?” NPR. https://www.npr.org/transcripts/nx-s1-5758059.
9. Rappeport, Alan. 2026. “Trump Removes Sanctions on Russia to Help Oil Flow amid Iran Conflict.” The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2026/03/12/us/politics/trump-russia-oil-sanctions.html.
10. “China Imports from Russia 2026-2027 Data.” n.d. Trading Economics. https://tradingeconomics.com/china/imports/russia.
11. Jensen, Benjamin, and Jose M. Macias III. 2025. “Ghost Busters: Options for Breaking Russia’s Shadow Fleet.” CSIS. https://www.csis.org/analysis/ghost-busters-options-breaking-russias-shadow-fleet.
12. Fenwick, Jack. 2026. “Britain Now ‘Ready’ to Seize Russian Shadow Fleet Ships, Healey Says.” BBC News.

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