By: Christophorus Praditya
Edited By: Rose Kores
Introduction
China has undergone rapid urbanization ever since the 1980s, with its urban population growing from 36.2% in 2000 to 54.7% in 2014.1 This rapid development converted urban green space into impermeable pavements, causing multiple issues such as decreased water quality and availability. Among these issues, urban flooding emerged as the most pressing due to China’s extreme weather conditions. Between 2011 and 2014, 62% of Chinese cities experienced urban flooding that led to property damage and loss of life, with economic losses amounting to $100 billion.2
The Chinese government spearheaded the Sponge City Initiative in multiple pilot cities in 2015 to mitigate these issues. This initiative aims to redefine the urban system to operate like a sponge to absorb, store, purify, and reuse it when needed. Drawing inspiration from projects such as the Low Impact Development initiative in the United States and Australia’s Sensitive Urban Design approach, this initiative encourages the use of natural and semi-natural methods for controlling water cycles. It aims to retain 70% of yearly rainfall and limit urban flooding and water logging. This enhances urban water quality, alleviates the damage to natural ecosystems, and reduces the effects of urban heat islands.3 To support the initiative, the national government offers funds for pilot cities to finance the program during its first three years: RMB 400 million (USD 46.1 million) per year for each city, RMB 500 million (USD 57.6 million) for each provincial capital, and RMB 600 million (USD 69.1 million) for each municipality.3
Selection of the Pilot Cities
In 2015, the State Council of China issued the Guideline on Promoting the Construction of Sponge Cities. This guideline outlined three main principles of Sponge Cities: 1) adhere to the ecology and natural cycle; 2) adhere to guiding and developing through planning; and 3) adhere to governmental guidance and social participation.3 The Ministry of Housing and Rural-Urban Development (UHURD), Ministry of Finance (MOF), and the Ministry of Water Resources (MWR) were in charge of reviewing, evaluating, and selecting pilot cities that were recommended by the provincial governments.
These pilot cities were suggested by their respective provincial government based on their proposal quality, financial status, and leadership capacity. To qualify, each city needed to demonstrate a strong case for renewing its urban drainage infrastructure, along with a realistic capacity to meet the program’s targets within its given timeline. Pilot cities also had to designate demonstration areas larger than 15 km² with an annual average rainfall above 400 mm.4 The Chinese government placed high priority on projects that focused on reconstructing existing water and drainage systems, expanding green landscapes, and incorporating green building designs that reflected local, social, and cultural needs. In the first round of the selection process, 16 pilot cities were chosen out of 130 proposals.3 These cities are meant to represent China’s diverse climates and landscapes, along with the potential risks that can arise from different hydrological conditions. However, the selection process raised the important question about how to balance technical feasibility and inclusivity.
Behind the Piloting: Bias in the Sponge City Selection
After its successful launch in 2013, the government has selected 30 pilot cities to implement the Sponge City initiatives.5 Selecting these pilot cities carries a significant responsibility, especially in ensuring that the program can be implemented successfully and serve as a model for future cohorts. Although the Chinese government aims to represent a wide range of regions and socioeconomic contexts, the current pilot cities lean toward larger, more technically capable urban centers. From an urban studies perspective, cities with larger populations, higher economic development and GDP per capita, and a strong tertiary sector are naturally more inclined to adopt advanced urban governance strategies.6 Out of 30 pilot cities, 12 of them at least fall within the categories of either provincial capitals or sub-provincial cities. Cities like Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen, and Chongqing have major populations, high GDP per capita, and strong tertiary sectors. While some cities such as Baicheng, Pingxiang, Guyuan, and Hebi do not follow this pattern and are more economically disadvantaged, their representation remains limited compared to the dominance of wealthier, more capable urban centers.
Although this bias is clear, the ministries selected these cities because they have the capacity to implement the pilot project and ensure that its outcomes can be replicated elsewhere. Their ability to prepare detailed technical proposals for Sponge City development and their strong administrative systems make them the safest choices for the initial rollout. In contrast, smaller cities face disadvantages due to limited technical expertise and weaker capacity to develop competitive proposals. Beyond administrative and technical capability, the selection process also reflects the government’s intention to create “symbolic” cities that carry political value. Their visibility amplifies the program’s overall impact, attracts international attention, and helps draw in future public-private partnerships (PPPs).7
Unfortunately, this process also created injustice for small and economically disadvantaged cities that face severe flood risks. Their limited resources and capability to craft a comprehensive proposal excluded them from the Sponge City selection process. Baoding, for instance, experienced a massive flood in 2023 that killed two people and forced thousands to relocate.8 Despite the accident, Baoding remains to be overshadowed by neighboring cities such as Beijing or Tianjin, which are cities that have a larger capacity to implement Sponge City initiatives and hold political significance in the international arena. While Beijing and Tianjin might be more “safe” options due to their capabilities, cities that are more vulnerable due to their size and economic status will fall further behind if the government maintains its current approach. This duality highlights key issues of climate injustice within the world’s leading climate-adaptation initiative and raises concerns about whether a bottom-up approach is still appropriate in the initiative’s selection process.
The Path Forward: Ensuring Inclusivity in the Sponge Cities
The Chinese government has identified 641 flood-vulnerable cities, yet the Sponge City Program currently only supports 30 pilot cities.9 This discrepancy leaves hundreds of climate vulnerable cities without the government resources needed to adapt to worsening climate conditions. Moving forward, the Chinese government could expand the program to include the small and impoverished cities that often face the greatest flood risks but have the least capacity to respond to them. Replicating the lessons and institutional models from the existing pilot cities and applying them to lower-capacity cities would help strengthen their resilience despite limited technical and financial resources.
At the same time, the government’s current approach of selecting the pilot cities based on their competitive proposals has created an unintentional injustice that favors wealthier and larger cities. To combat this, the central government could adopt a more top-down selection process for new target cities to mitigate the unconscious bias. Through centrally-developed plans and blueprints, local governments could validate and refine the proposed plans based on their hydrological, geographic, and social conditions to ensure its implementability in the local context. This approach would lower entry barriers for cities with limited resources while avoiding the one-size-fits-all implementation model.
Finally, scaling the Sponge City vision will require greater visibility and clearer performance data to attract private investment in the PPPs model. Establishing an effective performance monitoring metric and open-data reporting system will improve visibility of program implementation and boost investors’ confidence in the project. Partnership with universities, non-governmental organizations, and research centers could further enhance public awareness and international credibility. Taken together, these strategies could lower perceived risks and evolve the Sponge City from isolated pilot programs into a scalable, national implementation framework that supports long-term climate resilience.
Works Cited
- National Bureau of Statistics of China. 2015. China Statistical Yearbook 2015. Beijing: China Statistics Press.
- Li, H., L. Ding, M. Ren, C. Li, and H. Wang. 2017. “Sponge City Construction in China: A Survey of the Challenges and Opportunities.” Water 9, no. 9: 594. https://doi.org/10.3390/w9090594.
- General Office of the State Council (GOSC). 2015. “Guideline to Promote Building Sponge Cities.” http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2015-10/16/content_10228.htm.
- Griffiths, James, Faith Ka Shun Chan, Michelle Shao, Fangfang Zhu, and David Laurence Higgitt. 2020. “Interpretation and Application of Sponge City Guidelines in China.” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences 378, no. 2168 (April 3, 2020): 20190222. https://doi.org/10.1098/rsta.2019.0222.
- Chikhi, Faiza, Chuangcheng Li, Qunfeng Ji, and Xilin Zhou. 2023. “Review of Sponge City Implementation in China: Performance and Policy.” Water Science and Technology 88, no. 10 (November 15, 2023): 2499–2520. https://doi.org/10.2166/wst.2023.312.
- Ma, Wenting, Martin de Jong, Thomas Hoppe, and Mark de Bruijne. 2021. “From City Promotion via City Marketing to City Branding: Examining Urban Strategies in 23 Chinese Cities.” Cities 116 (2021): 103269. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cities.2021.103269.
- Li, Lei, Christopher D. Ives, Jeremy Carter, Alexandra M. Collins, Olalekan Adekola, Daniel Green, Ali Cheshmehzangi, and Faith Ka Shun Chan. 2026. “Examining Sponge City Coverage and Perceptions in Global News Media.” Cities 169 (2026): 106588. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cities.2025.106588.
- Reuters. 2025. “Rain in Northern China Kills 2, Forces Thousands to Relocate.” https://www.reuters.com/sustainability/climate-energy/rain-northern-china-kills-2-forces-thousands-relocate-2025-07-27/.
- “Control and Countermeasure of Flood in China.” 2014. Research Group of Control and Countermeasure of Flood. China Flood Drought 3: 46–48.
Author Bio
Christophorus Ariobumi Praditya is a Master of Public Administration candidate at Cornell University’s Brooks School of Public Policy, specializing in science and technology policy. He is also an Environmental Finance and Impact Investing (EFII) Fellow, driven by his interest in the intersection of digital technology and sustainability. His work examines urban policy, gig and labor economy, and digital sustainability. Prior to Cornell, he worked as a public policy and government affairs consultant in Indonesia, advising public and private sector clients on navigating complex regulatory environments, developing stakeholder engagement strategies, and analyzing policy impacts across sectors.
